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Kahn (2005) found that ethnic heterogeneity reduces the number of deaths 
caused by natural disasters, a finding that is contrary to theoretical predictions. This 
paper casts doubt on this finding and uses cross-country data from 1965 to 2008 to 
conduct a re-estimation. To alleviate omitted variable bias, a legal origin dummy and 
additional economic variables are incorporated as independent variables. Further, to 
control for measurement problems, I have included an ethnic fractionalization index 
and an ethnic polarization index to capture ethnic heterogeneity. The key finding is 
that ethnic polarization is positively related to number of deaths, while ethnic 
fractionalization is not. This implies that ethnic polarization increases the level of 
damage caused by natural disasters, and is a more appropriate measure for ethnic 
heterogeneity than ethnic fractionalization.   
Keywords: Deaths, Natural disaster, Ethnic fractionalization, Ethic polarization, 
Legal origin, Institution.   
JEL classification: D81, O11; Q54; Z13 I. Introduction 
With the recent devastating effects from natural disasters such as Hurricane 
Katrina, and the Sumatra and Kanto-Tohoku earthquakes, economists are 
increasingly interested in the outcomes of natural disasters. Existing works attempt 
to explore the relationship between economic condition and natural disasters.
1 The 
level of damage caused by natural disasters depends on economic factors such as 
economic openness, human capital, GDP per capita, and income inequality (Anbarci 
et al., 2005; Toya and Skidmore, 2007). In addition, quality of institution makes a 
significant contribution to the reduction of such damage (e.g., Kahn, 2005; Escaleras 
et al., 2007).   
Easterly and Levine (1997) suggest that ethnic heterogeneity impedes 
economic growth. Further, ethnic heterogeneity slows development through the 
reduction of investment and the probability of conflict (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 
2005a, 2005b). Therefore, in heterogeneous societies, it is difficult for people to take 
the collective action required to cope with unexpected events such as natural 
disasters. La Porta et al. (1999) state ethnic heterogeneity and legal origin as 
determining factors in institutional quality. Institution is considered to play an 
important role in reducing the impact of economic crisis (Johnson et al., 2000; 
Acemoglu et al., 2003). 
Kahn (2005) stresses the relationship between social heterogeneity and 
institutional quality, which influence the death rates from natural disasters. He 
argues, “If social capital is harder to build in more heterogeneous societies, 
institutional quality and heterogeneity measures could be negatively correlated” 
(Kahn, 2005, 281). Thus, the hypothesis follows that heterogeneity increases the 
death rate in disasters. Kahn (2005) used an ethnic fractionalization index and 
income Gini coefficients to examine the hypothesis. The main estimation results 
                                                  
1  Strobl (2011) provided evidence that hurricanes have a negative impact on coastal 
counties annual growth rate in the United States. suggest that “nations with higher ethnic fragmentation have lower death counts” 
(Kahn 2005, 282), although nations with larger income inequality have higher death 
counts.
2  I question these results because Kahn (2005) did not control for various key 
factors. In addition to the ethnic fractionalization index, this paper uses an ethnic 
polarization index, which is an alternative index of ethnic heterogeneity. Additional 
variables used in Toya and Skidmore (2007) are also included as independent 
variables to conduct the re-estimation. Furthermore, Kahn (2005) used data from 73 
countries, from 1980 to 2002. In this paper, to extend the dataset, the number of 
countries was increased to 90 and the estimated period spans 1965 to 2008.
3 While 
Kahn (2005) used 1,428–1,438 observations in the main estimations, this paper uses 
2,573–3,354. The key finding from the present paper is that nations with higher 
ethnic polarization have higher death counts, whereas ethnic fractionalization does 
not influence death counts. This is consistent with the assertion by Montalvo and 
Reynal-Querol (2005a, 2005b) that the polarization index is better suited to capture 
the effect of social heterogeneity than the traditional index of fractionalization. 
This paper is organized as follows: section II describes the data; section III 
presents the econometric specification; section IV exhibits the estimation results; 
and section V concludes. 
                                                  
2  With the exception of the main estimation, Kahn (2005) used a OLS model to 
estimate alternative specifications where the dependent variable is log (1+death). In 
those results, ethnic fractionalization takes positive and negative signs, and it is 
always statistically insignificant. This method, however, does not introduce a 
splitting process where zero-death count is estimated. Hence, the method is less 
accurate than the method (zero-inflated negative binominal model) mainly used for 
examination. 
3  Summary statistics and the list of countries are available from the author upon 
request.II. Data 
I used annual data on natural disasters from 90 countries from 1965 to 2008, 
for the estimations in this paper. The dependent variable is the number of deaths 
caused by natural disasters. I collected the number of deaths from EM-DAT 
(Emergency Events Database).
4
Ethnic fractionalization indexes have previously been used in classic 
literature to capture ethnic heterogeneity (Easterly and Levine, 1997; La Porta et al., 
1999). In more recent times, it has been asserted that ethnic polarization is the more 
appropriate index to capture ethnic heterogeneity, and has therefore been used as an 
alternative measure (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005a, 2005b). Hence, it is 
important to compare the effects of the ethnic fractionalization and ethnic 
polarization indexes, to scrutinize the effect of ethnic heterogeneity because 
estimation results vary according to the index used (e.g., Montalvo and 
Reynal-Querol 2005a, 2005b; Dincer, 2011). Kahn (2005) only used ethnic 
fractionalization as an independent variable. I used both ethnic fractionalization and 
ethnic polarization as proxy variables for ethnic heterogeneity to more precisely 
investigate the effect of ethnic heterogeneity. Due to a limitation in the data used in 
this study, ethnic fractionalization and polarization indexes take the same values for 
the 1965–2008 period.   
Du (2010) provided evidence that French legal origin often increases the 
likelihood of global crises, such as the oil and currency crises. Further, Du (2010) 
asserted that persistent institutions are more closely related to the occurrence of 
crisis than time-varying institutions captured by a corruption or autocracy index. 
Further, the proxy for corruption is considered an endogenous variable, resulting in 
estimation bias (Kahn, 2005; Escaleras et al., 2007). In contrast, legal origin is 
considered an exogenous variable. Hence, I incorporate a French legal origin dummy 
                                                  
4  Data was obtained from http://www.emdat.be. (accessed on June 1, 2011). but do not proxy time-varying institutions.   
Toya and Skidmore (2007) found that economic openness, government size, 
and schooling years affect the number of deaths caused by natural disasters. 
However, Kahn (2005) did not incorporate those variables as independent variables. 
The level of shock experienced in a natural disaster appears to differ between the 
agricultural sector and other sectors because farmers are involved more affected 
more directly by natural conditions. Thus, the ratio of the agricultural sector is taken 
into account. Schooling years are constructed based on data used in Easterly and 
Ross (1997). Schooling years are available for 1960, 1970, and 1980. Therefore, to 
construct panel data, additional data were generated by interpolation based on the 
assumption of constant changes in rates to make up for this deficiency for the period 
1960–1980. From 1981 to 2008, schooling years for 1980 is used.
5 To alleviate 
omitted variables bias, these variables are incorporated as independent variables. 
This paper also controlled for the variables used in Kahn (2005) such as 
income Gini coefficient, degree of democracy, GDP per capita, population, 
population density, absolute value of latitude, and time trend. Following Kahn 
(2005), for each nation this paper averages the income Gini coefficients of the World 
Bank (2010) within the year and then uses the average value of income Gini 
coefficients to capture income inequality. Ethnic polarization and fractionalization 
indexes are used in Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a, 2005b).
6 Degree of 
democracy is measured using a polity III dataset as used in La Porta et al. (1999).
7
                                                  
5  Schooling years are used in Easterly and Ross (1997). The data are available from 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,co
ntentMDK:20700002~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.ht
ml (accessed June 2, 2011). 
6  Data on ethnic fractionalization and polarization are available at 
http://www.econ.upf.edu/~reynal/data_web.htm (accessed on June 1, 2011). 
7  French legal origin dummy and measure of democracy are available at The democracy index ranges from 1 (low) to 10 (high). All other data used in this 
paper are gathered from the World Bank (2010).     
III. Econometric Specification   
The data on technological disasters used in this study can be considered to be 
typical count data. The Poisson regression model has been widely used to study such 
data (Greene, 2008). However, the Poisson model is not appropriate when the data is 
over-dispersed. In this case, Kahn (2005) used a zero-inflated negative binominal 
(ZINB) model, which allowed for the over-dispersion of death counts by introducing 
a splitting process. In a ZINB model, the negative binominal model and logit model 
are estimated simultaneously. In the logit model, the dependent variable takes 1 if 
nobody dies from natural disasters in nation j in year t. In the negative binominal 
model, the determinants of number of deaths are estimated. This paper also employs 
the ZINB model. Following Kahn (2005), for the logit estimation, independent 
variables are the count of natural disasters taken place in nation j in year t, the
interaction of this count with a nation’s population and GDP per capita. In the 
negative binominal model, as explained in the previous section, various economic 
and institutional variables are included as independent variables. 
The key dependent variables are ethnic polarization and fractionalization 
indexes. If ethnic heterogeneity leads to increase of deaths caused by disasters, 
indexes of ethnic heterogeneity are expected to take the positive sign when the 
number of deaths from natural disasters is estimated. 
IV. Results 
The estimation results when both ethnic fractionalization and polarization are 
incorporated to capture ethnic heterogeneity are exhibited in Table 1. However, the 
                                                                                                                                                  
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/dataset (accessed on June 1, 
2011).results in Table 1 are difficult to interpret because the correlation between the 
fractionalization and polarization indexes may create a problem of multicollinearity 
(Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005a, 2005b). Hence, for a robustness check, I 
conducted the estimation using alternative specifications. Table 2 shows the results 
when only ethnic polarization is incorporated, while the results for ethnic 
fractionalization are shown in Table 3. I purposely focused on the results of the 
proxies for ethnic heterogeneity and as such only their results are exhibited in Tables 
2 and 3. In each table, GDP per capita is included to capture the degree of economic 
development in columns (1)–(4), whereas the logarithms for GDP per capita are 
included in columns (5)–(8). Further, each table, to address the issue of 
heteroscedasticity, displays z-statistics in parentheses, calculated using robust 
standard errors adjusted for within-nation clustering. To examine the hypothesis 
regarding the effect of ethnic heterogeneity on the number of deaths from a disaster, 
this paper focuses on the results from the negative-binominal model, rather than 
those of the logit model. 
I see in Table 1 that ethnic polarization takes the positive sign and is 
statistically significant in all estimations. Its absolute values range from 1.14 to 2.14. 
In contrast, contrary to the prediction, ethnic fractionalization takes the negative sign 
with the exception of column (1). Further, ethnic fractionalization is not statistically 
significant in columns (1)–(8). Hence, the effects of ethnic heterogeneity are 
obviously different between polarization and fractionalization indexes. Concerning 
income inequality, the Gini coefficient takes the negative sign in columns (1) and (5) 
and is statistically insignificant. This suggests that income inequality does not 
influence the number of deaths. Ethnic heterogeneity has a greater effect than 
economic heterogeneity, which is contrary to Kahn (2005). With regard to other 
proxies for institutional quality, the French legal origin dummy yields the positive 
sign with the exception of column (2). However, it is not statistically significant in 
all estimations.   
GDP per capita takes the negative sign in column (1), while it takes the 
positive sign in columns (2)–(4). GDP per capita is not statistically significant in all estimations. In contrast, Log(GDP per capita) takes the negative sign and is 
statistically significant in columns (5)–(8), suggesting that the number of deaths 
from natural disasters is smaller in more developed countries, consistent with 
previous works (Kahn, 2005; Toya and Skidmore, 2007). Schooling years produces a 
negative sign in all estimations and is statistically significant in columns (1), (2), and 
(6). This indicates that human capital formation reduces the death count in disasters 
even after controlling for GDP per capita, which supports Toya and Skidmore (2007). 
The democracy index shows the positive sign in all estimations and is statistically 
significant in columns (1), (5), (6), and (7). This is contrary to the prediction that 
higher quality institutions lead to lower death counts. A probable reason for this 
result is that there is a “discrepancy between perceived institutions and actual 
institutions [which] weakens their powers in measuring institutional quality and 
predicting the likelihood and intensity of crisis” (Du, 2010; 179). In contrast, ethnic 
heterogeneity is considered to be an objective measure and is unlikely to suffer such 
bias.
Table 2 shows that ethnic polarization takes the positive sign and is 
statistically significant in all estimations. Its absolute values range between 1.12 and 
1.67, which is similar to those in Table 1. I see in Table 3 that in all estimations 
ethnic fractionalization is not statistically significant, despite taking the positive sign. 
In summary, the results for ethnic heterogeneity are robust in the alternative 
specifications. Considering the results of ethnic polarization and fractionalization 
presented in Tables 1–3 as a whole, leads me to argue that ethnic polarization 
increases the number of deaths caused by natural disasters because ethnic 
polarization captures the ethnic heterogeneity effect. 
V. Conclusions
Kahn (2005) found that ethnic heterogeneity reduces the number of deaths 
caused by natural disasters; a result that is contrary to the prediction proposed by 
Kahn (2005) and is therefore unconvincing. The present paper questions this finding and conducted a re-estimation. In this paper, to improve the estimation conducted by 
Kahn (2005), I extended the period of the cross-country panel data to 1965–2008 and 
controlled for key factors that were not captured in Kahn (2005). Further, to control 
for measurement issues, this paper not only used an ethnic fractionalization index, 
but also an ethnic polarization index to capture ethnic heterogeneity. Estimation 
results suggest that ethnic polarization is positively related to the number of deaths 
caused by natural disasters; in contrast, ethnic fractionalization does not influence 
the death count. This implies that ethnic polarization increases the level of damage 
caused by natural disasters, and is a more appropriate measure for ethnic 
heterogeneity than ethnic fractionalization, which is in line with Montalvo and 
Reynal-Querol (2005a, 2005b).   REFERENCES 
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Table 1.    Determinants of annual national deaths from natural disasters 
  (zero-inflated negative binominal regressions) 
  (1)   (2)  (3) (4) (5)   (6)  (7)  (8)
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  Zero-inflated logit model  
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2573 2691 3183 3354 2573 2691 3183 3354
Non-zero  observations 1323 1367 1524 1570 1323 1367 1524 1570 
Log likelihood function  –9073 –9402  –10585 –10876 –9065 –9416  –10568 –10865
Note: Each column in this table reports a separate estimate of a zero-inflated negative binominal model. As 
discussed in the text, this model has two equations. The lower panel of the table reports the logit model 
estimates of the probability that nobody becomes a victim of a natural disaster. The upper panel reports the 
results from the negative binominal regression. Values in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust 
standard errors adjusted for within-nation clustering. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. The sample size may vary across different regression specifications due to the constraints 
of data availability.1
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